Citation: MEDLAND, L.S., SCOTT, R.E. and COTTON, A.P., 2016. Achieving sustainable sanitation chains through better informed and more systematic improvements: lessons from multi-city research in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Sanitation Service Chain 21
Urban sanitation systems can be broadly categorized as either physically networked (such as 22 conventional sewerage) or as sanitation service networks, where on-plot latrines, whilst not 23 connected to a sewerage system, are the first component in a service chain. The service chain 24 comprises: excreta capture and storage in a latrine pit or septic tank; emptying of the pit or tank; 25 transport of the contents; sludge treatment (though not common); and end-use or final disposal. 26 This chain of sanitation services is collectively known as Faecal Sludge Management (FSM). Some 27 sewerage networks exist in Sub-Saharan Africa but they are rare and often in a poor state of repair 28 and functionality. The service chain system is therefore the predominant sanitation system in the 29 towns and cities of low and middle-income countries. This has led to profound problems in terms of 30 how to collect and treat the faecal sludge from on-site facilities. The sanitation service chain was 31 developed to conceptualise this ever growing problem and has become a widely used and 32 recognised framework for understanding the effective management of faecal sludge, as depicted in 33 Figure Urban sanitation service chains are complex and fragmented, involving a multiplicity of service 37 providers and typically resulting in unsustainable or inadequate services. Many discrete sanitation 38 interventions such as building latrines or introducing emptying services aim to improve a particular 39 aspect of the urban sanitation chain. However, neither top-down sanitation master planning nor ad-40 hoc project based action plans have yet been able to respond effectively to the challenges of urban 41 sanitation. 42
The purpose of this paper is to present the synthesised findings of the SPLASH Urban Sanitation 43 research programme through the framework of the sanitation service chain. The paper identifies 44 cross-cutting findings from the 5 individual research projects. These are presented both through the 45 stages of the urban sanitation service chain and the overarching framework of the enabling 46 environment. The SPLASH programme was the first of its kind and mirrors the broader shift 47 occurring in sanitation interventions, away from piecemeal approaches with limited consideration of 48 the wider system within which they operate, towards a more systematic analysis of the whole 49 sanitation service chain. Through this research, it has been possible to identify situations where 50 incremental improvements are being made with varying degrees of success. Most importantly, it has 51 identified weaknesses to the sanitation service chains where progress is either slow or extremely 52 limited. It is through these weaknesses that key questions affecting the long term sustainability of 53 sanitation service chains need to be answered. 54
55
SPLASH was the name of the European Union Water Initiative's European Research Area Network 56 (EUWI ERA-net), a consortium of 16 ministries, funding agencies, national research and technological 57 development authorities from 11 European countries who came together to agree a research 58 agenda and jointly fund research activities benefitting from a transnational approach. The 59 programme was designed in accordance with good research management practice as developed 60 within the Era-net, key features including: greater symmetry of research partnerships between 61
Northern and Southern institutions to improve relevance, ownership and quality of research, 62 mandating a minimum of 50 percent funding to be allocated to Southern partners; a requirement to 63 incorporate capacity development for Southern researchers and institutions; consultative and 64 participative programme design, and stakeholder engagement plans. The major objective of the 65 SPLASH urban sanitation research programme (2010 to 2014) was to contribute to the 66 understanding and implementation at scale of sustainable sanitation service chains in low-income 67 urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa by building on the local research partnerships of successful 68 bidders. After a competitive bidding process, 5 international consortia received funding. The results 69 presented here are a synthesis of the empirical outputs from the 5 consortia and draw on a 70 combined 20 years' worth of research from 8 cities in 7 Sub-Saharan African countries. 71
• 3K-SAN -Kisumu (Kenya), Kigali (Rwanda), Kampala (Uganda) 72
• CLASS-A -Maputo (Mozambique) 73
• FaME -Dakar (Senegal), Kampala (Uganda), Accra (Ghana) 74
• MAFADY -Douala and Yaoundé (Cameroon) 75
• U-ACT -Kampala (Uganda) 76
The aggregate data set covers a wide range of both quantitative and qualitative research methods 77 including; 6,692 household surveys across 3 cities (3K-SAN), a randomised control trial across 40 78 slum areas (U-ACT), technical evaluations of 2,040 household latrines (U-ACT), a willingness to pay 79 survey with 200 households (U-ACT), prototype testing of 3 new latrine designs (MAFADY), 80 construction of faecal sludge drying beds and burning trials in pilot kilns (FaME) faecal waste from only 22% of households using on-site systems is safely managed. In some cases, 97 whilst the excreta might be safely emptied it is then dumped illegally (WSP2). Any break in the 98 service chain at any stage will cause the faecal sludge to be released untreated into the natural 99 environment, endangering the public health of the city and surrounding areas. The apparent 100 simplicity of the sanitation service chain depicted in Figure 1 hides the complexity of the enabling 101 environment within which the activities in the chain occur. 102 103
The most significant challenge in the delivery of urban services is the sheer scale of the problem. 104
The concept of planning is especially difficult in contexts where documents such as city master plans 105 risk soon becoming irrelevant in the face of rapid urban growth. One of the greatest challenges facing urban sanitation professionals is a low evidence base from 160 which to make decisions and drive change, especially when related to activities forming the enabling 161 environment. Our efforts should be based on experience, rather than experiment. The traditional 162 planning steps of 'where are we now?', 'where do we want to get to?' and 'how do we want to get 163 there?' (Tayler12) should in the context of a dynamic urban environment be preceded by the 164 question 'how have we got to where we are now and what lessons can we learn?'. 165
The research conducted through the SPLASH urban sanitation research programme has used the 166 sanitation service chain process as the primary means of analysing faecal sludge management 167 services in low-income areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme has collected additional data on 168 and reinforced some of what we already know, but shows that the same problems and challenges 169 are repeated in different cities, some of which are specific to low-income residents living in 170 unplanned or informal areas and some of which impact on the city as a whole. 171
Key challenges from Stage 1: Capture and storage 1 2
Between 1990 and 2012, 1.2 billion people globally have gained access to improved sanitation in 3 urban areas. However, the population of urban people without sanitation has actually increased 4 from 215 million in 1990 to 756 million in 2012 because population growth has outstripped the 5 number of people who gained access in real terms (WHO13). Whilst open defecation is still largely a 6 rural phenomenon, it is widely practiced by the poorest people living in urban areas. 7 8
The first stage in the sanitation service chain is the capture and storage of excreta. If excreta is not 9 captured at the point of defecation then it automatically goes untreated into the environment. 10
For many years, subsidies were used to support the construction of household toilets and latrines 11 through supply-led programmes. The use of subsidies fell out of favour and supply-led programmes 12
were replaced with demand-led programmes relying on more active participation of the households 13 to construct and use their own facilities. Demand led programmes work on the assumption that 14 demand for better sanitation facilities can be created, through various methods, and supported 15 through marketing campaigns. This approach has had some success in rural areas but the findings 16 from the SPLASH programme have shown that stimulating demand creation in the urban context is 17 more nuanced and challenging than that of rural settings. In cases where there are no physical constraints on building a latrine, the reluctance to build can 41 extend from a lack of knowledge on the types of latrine available or the perception that materials 42 are difficult to obtain from local markets (Godfrey17). The construction of household latrines is more 43 often than not supposed to be supported by the use of technical guidelines that provide information 44 on how latrines can be built, but the willingness and ability to enforce the use of specific designs is 45 severely limited. Findings from 3K-SAN showed a strong relationship between demand for sanitation 46 and knowledge about the costs and availability of services and markets. However, awareness of the 47 need for a sanitation facility does not necessarily translate into an installed facility; but higher levels 48 of awareness lead to more concerns about the adequacy of sanitation facilities in terms of quality, 49 accessibility, availability, affordability and acceptability. In Kigali, demand for sanitation as expressed 50 through the stages of preference intent and choice is high, while reaching the stage of installation is 51 constrained by people's access to finance, affordability of available options and levels of tenancy 52 (Okurut15) 53 54
Identifying indigenous knowledge as part of the assessment and decision-making process when 55 planning to improve sanitation facilities and services can support, or indeed contradict, previously 56 held pre-conceptions and assumptions. A risk assessment tool developed through the research in 57
Mozambique by the CLASS-A consortium has sought to address knowledge vulnerability by 58 identifying and making use of indigenous knowledge, through community workshops. These 59 facilitated workshops provide a means for indigenous knowledge about practices and risks held by 60 households and communities to be reported to those working at the municipality and local 61 government level (IWA18). This consultation stage helps to identify the knowledge people already 62 have about their sanitation systems, as the basis for designing and implementing educational or 63 awareness raising programmes, or indeed technical improvements. 64 65
The affordability of latrines and toilets is often cited as the most significant barrier to construction. 66
Households in urban areas can be more dependent on cash income than those in rural areas where 67 there can be other options for paying for goods and services (Wratten19). For households where the 68 primary earners work informally or in very low-paid unsecure jobs, cash income will not necessarily 69 be available when it is needed; especially for high cost items that are several times their monthly 70 household income. The International Finance Corporation reports that less than 25% of adults in 71
Sub-Saharan Africa have access to formal financial services which makes it difficult to make 72 productive investments in a business, their family or dwelling (IFC20). The research from Cameroon 73
showed that even for a very basic latrine that does nothing to protect groundwater resources, the 74 poorest households would have to spend a minimum of 70% of their average monthly family income 75 on construction (MAFADY21). 76 77
In terms of increasing the affordability, there are two key approaches; modifying the technology to 78 make it more affordable or increasing access to money which allows people to make a relatively 79 large one-off purchase. Making the latrine more affordable can be done by using fewer or cheaper 80 materials, making the materials cheaper to purchase, using a staged payment modality or a 81 combination of several approaches. Many countries have considered how to make latrines more 82 affordable but in some cases it requires more than a change in materials, it requires much more 83 significant trade-offs between achieving the ideal standards and responding to the local realities. 84
The research by 3K-SAN has shown that the availability of finance, be it formal, semi-formal or 85 informal, is one of the key drivers in supporting demand creation for latrine ownership or use at the 86 household level. The research has shown that in Kigali where there is a nationally driven programme 87
to support the use of bank accounts by the poorest people, there are lower levels of household 88 deprivation compared to Kampala and Kisumu, despite very low incomes (Okurut15). The research 89
by U-ACT in Kampala found that offering households micro credit for 18 months at 20% interest had 90 the same effect as reducing the investment required to build a latrine by 25% (Günther22). A local 91 outcome of this aspect of the research was the construction of 150 additional ventilated improved 92 pit (VIP) latrines serving 1,500 people (ibid). Increasing the availability of consumer finance is one of 93 the recommendations for developing an enabling environment in which private sector service 94 operators can be successful (IFC23). 95
By gaining access to finance, households can become active consumers and whilst there may be 96 many alternative services to spend their money on, each household can determine their own 97 spending priorities. Demand creation and behaviour change programmes can work on influencing 98 those priorities, although that in itself is a particularly daunting task. In the research from Kigali, 99
Kampala and Kisumu by 3K-SAN it is interesting to note that levels of willingness to invest in a latrine 100 are generally low, even amongst owner occupiers and resident landlords, who should in theory have 101 greater motivation for making the investment because they would be directly improving their own 102 situations and living conditions. The main constraint to the willingness to invest was identified as 103 affordability, together with the topography and lack of available space to construct a facility 104 (Okurut15). 105
The research by 3K-SAN has shown that focusing on just one element of demand creation is likely to 106 undermine the sustainability of sanitation services (Tsinda24). Together with research by U-ACT in 107 Kampala, the programme identified variations in the extent of demand and its realization between 108 sections of society. For example, vulnerable households reported higher levels of demand 109 (particularly those with females aged 6-17 and households without parents), as did owners of 110 property compared to tenants. Male heads of households were found to be more likely to initially 111 express a serious interest in purchasing a latrine but not completing the process, whereas female 112 headed households were more consistent in their intention to purchase and actual purchase 113 behaviour (i.e. moving from the intent state to the installed stage). 114 115
Research on the different elements needed to support demand creation is ongoing and over time, it 116 becomes possible to build up a more complete picture of the different nuances that influence 117 demand creation in a given context. However, a balance needs to be stuck between adopting highly 118 specific but piecemeal approaches in each settlement and adopting broader city wide approaches to 119 stimulate demand for improved sanitation and ensure capacity to respond to the resulting service 120 requirements. 121 122
Key challenges from Stage 2: Emptying, transport and transfer 1 2
The emptying and transportation aspects of the sanitation service chain are dominated almost 3 entirely by private sector operators and as such receive very little attention by many city authorities. 4
The exception being when operational licences or permits are supposed to be obtained, dumping or 5 tipping fees need to be paid. There is relatively little known about tanker operators and how they 6 work, which highlights a stark gap in understanding within the sector as a whole. Empirical data 7 available to estimate faecal sludge accumulation rates is currently missing and with it, an 8 understanding of the potential for faecal sludge management services (WSP2). 9 10
In many cities, manual emptying of latrines or septic tanks is illegal, but there is limited availability of 11 mechanical tankers to provide pit and septic tank emptying services. General reasons for this 12 mismatch in demand and supply pertain to the availability of equipment in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 13 extent of a secure customer base, financial, legal or regulatory barriers to starting up a small-scale 14 business. During a survey of 30 cities (Chowdhry25) found that the cost and sourcing of trucks was 15 the single biggest challenge for tanker entrepreneurs, with some of those in African cities costing an 16 average of 34,000USD. Where the use of manual emptying is illegal and the availability of tanker 17 operators is limited, there is a huge gap between the ideal service delivery and the real practicalities 18 of ground-level service delivery, as is the case in Kigali, Rwanda. 19 20
The MAFADY project, Cameroon, considered the current demand for pit emptying services in Douala 21
and Yaoundé and provided some interesting insights into the operations of small-scale, private 22 sector operators about whom there is still relatively little known compared to other stakeholders in 23 the sanitation service chain. In Yaoundé and Douala, many emptiers are unregistered as the 24 mechanism to issue permits for registered operations is not effectively implemented. There is little 25 incentive to formalise their informal operations, which has serious repercussions for employees who 26 work without contracts, regular salaries, training, health insurance or the necessary personal 27 protective equipment. Co-operative organisations of emptiers in Cameroon have never been 28 sustainable, so they are not represented at the administrative level of the cities and cannot actively 29 participate in decision making processes affecting their businesses (MAFADY21). 30 31
The extent of household demand for emptying services has been found to be strongly affected by 32 the availability and cost of service operators. In Douala, Yaoundé and Kigali, this has been found to 33 result in emptying delayed to the point where latrines and septic tanks are overflowing (in 34
Cameroon, only 14% of service customers planned the emptying operation), leading to significant 35 public health risks. In Cameroon, prices for emptying services are set according to the volume of the 36 tanker, the distance between the household and the dumpsite and ease of accessibility to the latrine 37 or septic tank. The prices for emptying are lower in Douala than in Yaoundé because there are more 38 operators available and greater competition between them. A majority of customers expressed 39 satisfaction in the prices charged by the tanker operators; however, most of the customers have 40 septic tanks rather than pit latrines so represent households in the higher income districts of both 41 cities. Due to the higher costs of mechanical emptying, manual emptying is generally preferred by 42 householders both in informal settlements and higher income areas in Douala and Yaoundé because 43 it can remove more of the waste material for a lower cost (MAFADY21). 44
Key challenges from Stage 3: Treatment for end-use or disposal
The technologies required to make the service chain function are for the most part known, especially 3 at the beginning of the chain where the challenge is more about encouraging households to build 4 systems that can be emptied easily, than in developing new alternatives. The key technological 5 challenge remaining is cost-effective, space efficient treatment processes that make the sludge safe 6 for disposal or further use. The treatment process is complicated by the additional waste found in 7 sludge removed from latrines. The research conducted in Douala and Yaoundé found that it 8 contained amongst other things; sand, clothes, broken bottles, batteries, plastic sachets, plastic 9 bottles, metal, syringes, pharmaceutical products, chemical and industrial pollutants, art materials, 10 oils and detergents (Mougoué26). When formal solid waste disposal options are not available, 11 disposal of the waste into a latrine may seem like a logical option for households although it 12 transfers the problem of waste management away from the household, onto the emptier and 13 potentially to treatment plant operators. 14 15
There is a significant difference between disposal through dumping and actual treatment of the 16 faecal sludge. The research by FaME in Kampala, Accra and Dakar and 3K-SAN in Kampala, Kisumu 17
and Kigali showed that existing faecal sludge treatment facilitates in these cities provide way below 18 the required treatment capacity to meet current or future needs. Where the private sector has 19 stepped in to provide services, the council authorities have often stepped back and not upheld their 20 responsibilities in terms of city infrastructure needs. Due to this lack of treatment facilities being 21 available, the most active stage of the service chain following the collection of faecal sludge from 22 latrines and septic tanks is likely to be transportation to a dumpsite. Official dumpsites are 23 themselves quite rare and suffer from chronic mismanagement. In Douala, the faecal sludge 24 dumpsite has been in use since 2005, but in 2009 people started moving into the area and building 25 homes. As a mangrove swamp, it is designated as a "green zone" and therefore illegal to build on, 26 but over 900 families now live within 300m of the site and household encroachment continues. The 27 dumpsite and its supporting infrastructure are poorly managed and not maintained so when the 28 road to the dumpsite becomes impassable, especially in the rainy season, the tankers discharge the 29 faecal sludge directly into the river at the entrance to the site or even along the road itself 30 (MAFADY21). This kind of dumping is, unfortunately, not uncommon, with significant implications 31 for public health. 32 33
One of the main challenges facing the operators of dumpsites is the cost. The majority of costs for 34 sanitation services are currently borne by service users (e.g. households or institutions such as 35 schools) when they pay to construct, maintain and empty their latrine or septic tank. The service 36
users cannot be expected to finance the entire service chain, consequently, the possibility of 37 generating revenue elsewhere within the chain is gaining prominence. The research conducted by 38 FaME in Kampala, Accra and Dakar has considered how faecal sludge can be used once it has been 39 properly treated and the market potential for new uses of faecal sludge were identified in each city. 40 41
Through field trials of treatment options, predominately drying beds, the research by FaME has 42 demonstrated that there is potential for the use of treated faecal sludge as a solid fuel. However, 43 market demand and hence market value for dried faecal sludge varies greatly between cities. The 44 local market potential for dried faecal sludge as a fuel depends on: faecal sludge characteristics; user 45 perceptions; existing fuels available; local industry requirements; legal arrangements and regulatory 46 restrictions; the use of subsidies; and the local supply of sludge (Diener27). An example of the 47 importance of local market conditions was found in Kampala where there is an established brick 48 production industry. Wastewater sludge can already be used as a raw material in brick production 49 but in Kampala, the raw materials for bricks are readily available in the locality and as such there was 50 limited interest in the potential for the use of faecal sludge in brick production (Diener27).There was 51 much more interest in the potential to use dried faecal sludge as fuel for the brick kilns themselves. 52
In order to achieve this, there needs to be new technologies developed to bring successful burning 53 trials to full scale testing. This reinforces the knowledge that system innovations cannot be achieved 54 through technological innovations alone, institutional and socio-cultural changes are needed as well 55 (Lopes28). 56 57
By starting to understand the complexities of specific market demands for treated faecal sludge, the 58 intention is that financial incentives can be generated throughout the sanitation service chain that 59 promote more efficiencies from capture through transport to treatment. However, it is not 60 recommended to predicate the long term functioning of the sanitation service chain on potential 61 financial flows. They are better treated as unpredictable financial inputs to urban sanitation 62 management given the potentially unstable and fluid nature of markets for treated faecal sludge and 63 financial models developed on that basis. 64 1 Key challenges from the enabling environment: cross-cutting issues 2
The term 'enabling environment' is used here to refer to the wider city wide system in which the 3 sanitation service chain operates and describes the inter-relationships between technical and non-4 technical elements identified as essential to support sanitation service delivery. They represent the 5 'big challenges' faced when trying to deliver services in difficult circumstances and will not be solved 6 easily or for individual services (sanitation, water, education, health etc.). In the SPLASH urban 7 sanitation research programme, policy, strategy and direction, laws and regulations, the availability 8 of financing and human capacity were considered in addition to the technologies available. A wide 9 range of stakeholders have key roles in urban sanitation including local and central government, 10 water utilities, private developers, informal private sector, civil society and individual households. All 11 of these stakeholders and the activities they try to achieve are heavily influenced by the enabling 12 environment they live and work in. 13 14
Polices and strategies play a part in setting the 'rules of the game' for activities carried out in a 15 specific sector. They are closely linked to financial planning and budgets, with the argument being 16 that if an activity does not contribute towards a policy objective and has not been outlined as an 17 action in a strategy then it is not important enough to warrant the allocation of resources. In many 18 cases, clearly defined policies or strategies that focus on sanitation or FSM services are not available 19 (Scott 29) . Poorly defined organisational roles and responsibilities continue to be a central problem 20 to effective programme implementation, leads to an overlapping of operational mandates and a 21 duplication of activities. It also leaves gaps in responsibilities which further increases confusion 22 around service provision. The most striking example of this poor definition of roles and 23 responsibilities and on the ground implementation of activities was highlighted in Cameroon, 24 through the MAFADY project, although the same problem was also found in all of the project 25 countries. In Cameroon there are seven different departments at the national level with a 26 responsibility for the management and remediation of wastewater and excreta, with a further three 27 departments at the district level. The institutional assessment conducted found that there is little co-28 ordination between them and several areas of overlap (MAFADY21). In Maputo (CLASS-A) it was 29 found that there were very limited levels of institutional responsibility for downstream impacts of 30 urban pollution (from poor sanitation) and none at all for the environmental health impacts 31 (Parkinson30). Despite knowing that the problem exists, detailed institutional assessments are rarely 32 carried out. The underlying problem is a lack of institutional capacity to enforce regulations and building 59 standards and when there is little or no enforcement capacity they can only ever be partially 60 effective. Whilst the use and enforcement of construction and building standards may be unpopular 61 in some cases, having appropriate latrine, toilet and septic tank constructions at the beginning of the 62 chain facilities the operation of the rest of it. 63 64
The issue of tenure status is gaining greater influence in the debates around access to services. 65
There exists a whole spectrum of tenure types across cities and the tenure conditions required as a 66 precondition for household expenditure on sanitation are not straightforward to define (Scott34). 67
Under the Human Right to Sanitation, those whose rights have been denied would have recourse to 68 action through judicial, administrative or other appropriate channels. Unfortunately, in many cases, 69 where tenants are occupying land illegally or do not hold formalised tenancy agreements they are 70 considered to be outside normal jurisdiction and can have no recourse to action (Adogo33). These 71 challenges extend beyond the provision of sanitation services and can only be changed by the 72 highest levels of government which makes it unlikely that sanitation alone will be the driving factor 73 for such changes. 74 75 In this context of poorly defined roles and responsibilities, a lack of staff capacity across the 76 fragmented institutional landscape and more particularly in the units within government at national 77 and decentralised levels that should be responsible for preventative healthcare and service 78 management also plays a critical role in the success of joined-up, systematic service delivery. As is 79 the case in many sectors, professional capacities of staff are low, which has a significant impact on 80 the ability of those staff to drive implementation on the ground. In Cameroon it was found that staff 81 tasked with the operation and maintenance of treatment facilities receive little or no training on the 82 management of these facilities which results in them being abandoned long before their designed 83 lifespan has ended (Mougoué26). At the city level in Douala and Yaoundé, staff shortages mean that 84 hygiene education and promotion activities are limited to periods of crisis rather than being an 85 ongoing activity (MAFADY21). 86 87
The UN Water -Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-water (GLAAS) report of 2014 88 identified that only 40% of countries surveyed were able to absorb (that is, to utilise) more than 75% 89 of the external aid for urban sanitation (WHO35) so there is finance available, but insufficient 90 capacity to capitalise on the availability of global funding is a generic problem facing the sector. For 91 example, the GLAAS report highlights that actual budget disbursement for water supply and 92 sanitation frequently fall short of the planned expenditure due, for example, to a lack of efficient 93 financial management processes or limited capacity of public and private sector implementation. In 94 2012/13, Uganda reported a release of 60% of the actual budget funds. Further details of the 95 underlying issues are fully explained in the GLAAS report (Ibid). 96
Inadequate or poorly organised funding arrangements are an ongoing problem in the sanitation 97 sector but co-ordinating budgets across multiple institutions or departments can be particularly 98 challenging. The research in Mozambique found that the lack of adequate budgets for the full range 99 of sanitation activities leads to the selective prioritisation of investments at the city level 100 (Parkinson30) which do not necessarily contribute to a successfully functioning system as a whole 101 and a piecemeal approach continues to dominate current sanitation related activities. This was 102 highlighted by the research from CLASS-A in Maputo which found that technical and implementation 103 based recommendations related to broader, city wide sanitation planning including solid waste and 104 storm water management were changed into more nebulous policy recommendations for a future 105 point in time because the budget available was insufficient to tackle everything at once. Whilst this 106 has been previously identified in relation to city-wide planning (Tayler36) it is otherwise rarely 107 recognised as a constraining factor to service provision which has to be addressed. 108 109
The research in Kampala, Accra and Dakar conducted by the FaME consortium highlighted that the 110 sanitation service chain breaks down due to both a lack of public or private investment and because 111 where financing is or should be available, it is not allocated to the appropriate service actors and 112 operators (public, private or community based) to make sure that the system remains functional 113 (Gold37). This was supported by the findings from Cameroon which demonstrated that although the 114 potential to levy a sanitation tax exists in legislation; it has not been implemented and consequently 115 cannot be used to finance activities within the sanitation service chain as expected when it was 116 introduced (Mougoué26). Despite intensive efforts under the SPLASH programme, it proved very 117 difficult to collect reliable financial flow data along the service chain. Consequently, it remains 118 unclear how and where available finance is best allocated to ensure that the overall system is 119 functional. 120 121
Conclusions on the synthesis of the SPLASH research projects 122 Urban sanitation service chains are complex and fragmented, involve many different service 123 providers and a range of central and local government departments. We conclude the following 124 points from our cross-cutting synthesis of the individual projects. 125
• It is important that we have a full understanding of how individual interventions by such 126 stakeholders affect local sanitation service chains. 127
• The broad planning questions of 'how have we got to where we are now and what lessons can 128 we learn?' are not currently considered within the sanitation service chain framework, which 129 focuses more on the 'where are we now and where do we want to get to' aspects of planning. 130
• Given that the sanitation service chain has to operate within the wider city planning context, 131 understanding how a city has reached its status quo is critical to developing the sanitation 132 service chain framework. 133
The research conducted as part of the SPLASH urban sanitation research programme has primarily 134 continued to focus on the existing processes in place. 
